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Abstract  
This	 article	 explores	 how	 ‘everyday’	 lawyers	 undertaking	 routine	 criminal	 defence	
cases	 navigate	 an	 authoritarian	 legal	 system.	 Based	 on	 original	 fieldwork	 in	 the	
‘disciplined	 democracy’	 of	 Myanmar,	 the	 article	 examines	 how	 hegemonic	 state	
power	and	a	functional	absence	of	the	rule	of	law	has	created	a	culture	of	passivity	
amongst	ordinary	practitioners.	 ‘Everyday’	 lawyers	are	nevertheless	able	to	uphold	
their	 clients’	 dignity	 by	 practical	 and	 material	 support	 for	 the	 individual	 human	
experience	–	and	in	so	doing,	subtly	resist,	evade	or	disrupt	state	power.	The	article	
draws	upon	the	literature	on	the	sociology	of	lawyering	and	resistance,	arguing	for	a	
multi-layered	understanding	of	dignity	going	beyond	lawyers’	contributions	to	their	
clients’	 legal	 autonomy.	 Focusing	on	dignity	provides	 an	 alternative	perspective	 to	
the	 otherwise	 often	 all-consuming	 rule	 of	 law	 discourse.	 In	 authoritarian	 legal	
systems,	 enhancing	 their	 clients’	 dignity	 beyond	 legal	 autonomy	may	 be	 the	 only	
meaningful	contribution	that	‘everyday’	lawyers	can	make.	
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Introduction		
 
“Although U Ko Ni was the one who physically died, the reality is that this 
murder represents the death of the rule of law” – U Robert San Aung, activist 
lawyer (Ei Ei Toe Lwin and Shoon Naing 2017)1   
	
On	29	January	2017,	U	Ko	Ni	was	shot	dead	as	he	waited	for	a	taxi	outside	Yangon	
International	 Airport	 in	 Myanmar.2	 A	 prominent	 constitutional	 lawyer,	 acclaimed	
reformer	 and	 senior	 legal	 adviser	 to	Daw	Aung	 San	 Suu	 Kyi’s3	National	 League	 for	
Democracy	 (‘NLD’),	 he	was	working	 on	 creative	 legal	 strategies	 to	 circumvent	 the	
constitutionally-enshrined	political	power	still	held	by	the	Myanmar	military	(Lintner	
2017;	Crouch	2017a;	Brennan	2017).		
	
The	murder	of	such	a	skilled	 legal	activist	who	was	deeply	 immersed	 in	using	 legal	
strategies	 to	 embed	 the	 rule	of	 law	 speaks	directly	 to	 the	dangers	of	 lawyering	 in	
‘hybrid’	regimes	(Bogaards	2009;	Levitsky	and	Way	2010;	Gilbert	and	Mohseni	2011),	
those	 countries	 in	 which	 elements	 of	 authoritarianism	 and	 democracy	 commingle	
(Collier	 and	 Levitsky	 1997;	 Gilbert	 and	 Mohseni	 2011).	 Yet	 even	 before	 Ko	 Ni’s	
assassination,	there	was	an	almost	obsessive	focus	on	the	rule	of	 law	in	Myanmar,	
and	its	various	meanings	and	prospects.	From	Cheesman’s	comprehensive	dissection	
of	the	inherently	contested	nature	of	the	concept	and	its	relationship	to	democracy	
(2009;	2014;	2015a;	2015b;	2016;	2017),	to	Prasse-Freeman’s	discussion	of	the	way	
in	 which	 it	 relates	 to	 broader	 concepts	 of	 informal	 social	 justice	 (Prasse-Freeman	
2014;	2015),	 the	 rule	of	 law	 in	Myanmar	has	been	a	popular	 subject	 for	academic	
analysis.	 Development	 practitioners,	 domestic	 and	 international	 policymakers	 and	
civil	 society	 organisations	 alike	 have	 also	 heralded	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 as	 the	 key	 to	
Myanmar’s	future	prosperity	and	social	harmony	(UNDP	2016;	USAID	2017;	Xinhua	
2018;	Crouch	2017b).		
	
From	 another	 perspective,	 this	 preoccupation	 with	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 is	 somewhat	
puzzling,	given	that	Myanmar	retains	many	of	the	hallmarks	of	despotic	governance	
(chiefly	linked	to	a	lack	of	restraint	on	arbitrary	state	power)	in	a	way	that	makes	the	
rule	of	law	“practically	incompatible”	with	such	regimes	(Luban	2010:	10).	Whether	
conceptualised	 as	 a	 formalist,	 minimum	 system	 of	 publicly	 and	 prospectively	
promulgated	 rules	 applying	 to	 all,	 or	 as	 a	 fully	 articulated	 substantive	 political	
morality	 with	 a	 rich	 normative	 content	 (Peerenboom	 2004;	 Tamanaha	 2004;	
Carothers	2010),	restraint	of	arbitrary	state	power	is	an	essential	constituent	of	the	
rule	of	law	(Krygier	2011,	2016).	Thus,	in	hybrid	political	systems	where	legal	norms	
(such	 as	 the	 constitution)	 and	 institutions	 (such	 as	 courts,	 anti-corruption	
commissions)	are	 in	effect	 co-opted	by	 the	executive,	 the	 rule	of	 law	 is	an	 ‘empty	
signifier’	(Laclau	2005	as	cited	by	Prasse-Freeman	2015):	either	functionally	absent,	
used	to	justify	autocratic	tendencies,	or	both.		
	
Whilst	 acknowledging	 the	 importance	 of	 rule	 of	 law	 discourse	 in	 Myanmar	 and	
beyond,	this	article	aims	to	contribute	to	the	literature	on	hybrid	and	authoritarian	
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regimes	 by	 examining	 the	 role	 of	 lawyers	 and	 what	 Raz	 described	 as	 the	 ‘other	
virtues’	of	 a	 legal	 system	 (1979:	211).	However,	 rather	 than	 focusing	on	politically	
engaged,	 activist	 or	 otherwise	 celebrated	 practitioners	 as	 others	 have	 done	
(Cheesman	and	Kyaw	Min	San	2013;	Saffin	and	Willis	2017),	we	examine	the	role	of	
the	 ‘everyday	 lawyer’	–	 those	practitioners	who	work	on	“ordinary,	modest	cases”	
(Kritzer	1990:	3).	Our	starting-point	is	that	since	the	rule	of	law	is	not	currently	viable	
in	Myanmar,	there	is	a	need	to	explore	everyday	lawyers’	practice,	their	relationship	
to	their	clients	as	well	as	how	they	negotiate	overwhelming	legal	power.	In	Myanmar	
as	 elsewhere,	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 has	 a	 tendency	 to	 obscure	 other	 issues,	 to	 the	
detriment	 of	 otherwise	 identifying	 and	 analysing	 such	 ‘other	 virtues’	 of	 a	 legal	
system	(Raz	1979:	211).	We	aim	instead	to	analyse	one	such	alternative	virtue	–	the	
concept	 of	 dignity	 –	 and	 to	 explore	 how	 domestic	 lawyers	 seek	 to	 protect	 their	
clients’	 dignity	 in	 the	 absence	of	 even	 the	 thinnest	 version	of	 the	 rule	 of	 law.	We	
look	 beyond	 Raz’s	 definition	 of	 dignity	 as	 respect	 for	 autonomy,	 drawing	 instead	
upon	 analysis	 from	 Luban	 (2005)	 and	 Vischer	 (2011)	 who	 explore	 other	 ‘lived	
realities’	 of	 the	 concept,	 including	 how	 lawyers	 seek	 to	 protect	 their	 clients	 from	
humiliation.	In	so	doing,	this	raises	the	question	of	whether	lawyers	and	their	clients	
are	 ultimately	 enacting	 a	 form	 of	 ‘everyday’	 (as	 opposed	 to	 a	 form	 of	 ‘direct’)	
resistance	(Scott	1985;	1989;	1990)	to	entirely	dominant	institutional	legal	power.	
	
Our	 research	 is	 informed	 by	 qualitative	 interviews	 and	 focus	 groups	with	 over	 50	
lawyers	 and	 other	 legal	 professionals	 conducted	 in	Myanmar	 in	 late	 2017.	 All	 the	
lawyers	and	justice	sector	professionals	with	whom	we	spoke	worked	on	‘everyday’	
cases,	mundane	criminal	matters	including	traffic	accidents,	drug	cases,	assaults	and	
thefts.		 Their	quotidian	practices	demonstrate	 that	whilst	 extant	political	 and	 legal	
power	makes	it	impossible	for	them	to	advance	the	rule	of	law,	lawyers	still	have	the	
capacity	 to	 support	 their	 clients’	 fundamental	 human	 dignity	 by	 ensuring	 their	
stories	 are	 heard,	 as	 well	 as	 by	 providing	 basic	 physical,	 medical	 and	 material	
support.	 For	 clients	 who	 would	 otherwise	 face	 the	 full,	 unfiltered	 force	 of	 the	
authorities,	 the	 upholding	 of	 dignity	 in	 a	 rule	 of	 law	 deficient	 legal	 system	
constitutes	both	a	meaningful	and	an	intended	form	of	resistance.	
	
Section	 one	 of	 the	 article	 begins	 with	 a	 consideration	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law,	 its	 core	
function	 in	 restraining	 arbitrary	 state	 power,	 and	 explores	 a	 broader	 concept	 of	
human	 dignity	 as	 one	 of	 the	 ‘other	 virtues’	 associated	with	 a	 legal	 system	 and	 in	
lawyer-client	relations.	Section	two	explores	the	constraints	upon	lawyers	where	the	
rule	of	law	is	absent,	linking	lawyers’	efforts	to	uphold	their	clients’	dignity	with	the	
concept	of	‘everyday	resistance’.	The	focus	of	section	three	is	the	specific	context	of	
law	and	the	legal	system	in	Myanmar,	and	how	the	country’s	overwhelmingly	non-
elite	 lawyers	 have	 struggled	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law.	 In	 section	 four	we	
discuss	 the	 key	 findings	 from	 our	 research,	 exploring	 how	 lawyers’	 work	 upholds	
their	 clients’	 dignity	 and	 how	 they	 are	 thereby	 engaging	 in	 everyday	 acts	 of	
resistance.	 Ultimately,	 we	 conclude	 that	 whilst	 lawyers	 may	 be	 significantly	
restricted	 in	what	 they	can	achieve	 for	 litigants,	within	 the	spaces	of	 the	everyday	
practice	of	lawyering	there	nevertheless	exist	opportunities	to	promote	dignity	as	an	
alternative	virtue	.	Although	such	opportunities	to	enact	‘everyday	resistance’	should	
not	be	over-romanticised	 (as	Scott	 (1985)	cautions),	 they	provide	an	alternative	 to	
  
4 
the	 often	 all-consuming	 rule	 of	 law	 narrative,	 particularly	 when	 considering	 how	
ordinary	lawyers	and	their	clients	attempt	to	mediate	and	negotiate	state	power.	
 
1.	The	Rule	of	Law	and	‘Other	Virtues’	
	
The	 rule	 of	 law	 has	 been	 described	 as	 the	 pre-eminent	 validating	 ideal	 for	
democratic	 institutions	 everywhere	 (Tamanaha	 2007:	 19).	 Having	 been	 through	
something	of	a	‘crisis	of	legitimacy’	amid	claims	of	hubristic	legalism,	overreach	and	
failure	(e.g.	Golub	in	Carothers	2010;	McEvoy	2007;	Marshall	2014),	a	more	humble	
series	of	rule	of	law	discourses	is	discernible	in	the	literature	focusing	on	pluralistic,	
grassroots	 and	 ends-based	 objectives	 (Kleinfeld-Belton	 2012;	 Golub	 2010;	 Quigley	
2009).	 As	 McAuliffe	 (2013)	 has	 highlighted,	 more	 persuasive	 recent	 rule	 of	 law	
scholarship	has	emphasised	the	inevitable	compromises	contained	in	such	a	protean	
concept.	There	 is	now	a	much	greater	awareness	of	how	the	term	can	be	hijacked	
for	 neo-colonialist	 (Brown	 2017)	 or	 globalised	 neo-liberal	 corporatist	 ends	
(Schwöbel-Patel	2018).		
	
At	its	core,	the	rule	of	law	requires	the	ruled	and	the	rulers	to	obey	the	law	and	that	
the	law	is	capable	of	guiding	behaviour	(Raz	1979:	212-3).	Such	a	focus	divides	into	
‘thin’,	 instrumental,	 formalist	 or	 positivistic	 conceptions	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 (where	
the	focus	lies	on	those	qualities	of	a	legal	system	that	enable	it	to	function	as	such,	
regardless	of	the	ultimate	content	of	the	 laws)	and	 ‘thicker’,	more	substantive	and	
value-laden	understandings	of	a	 legal	system	and	 its	underlying	political	morality	–	
whether	 democratic,	 libertarian	 or	 otherwise)	 (Dyzenhaus	 1997,	 2006;	 Tamanaha	
2004;	 Peerenboom	 2004;	 Carothers	 2010).	 Perhaps	 the	 only	 area	 of	 consensus	
between	formalists	and	substantivists	 is	that	an	essential	component	of	the	rule	of	
law	 is	 its	 capacity	 to	 act	 as	 a	 restraint	 on	 arbitrary	 state	 power.	 Where	 power	
holders	are	able	to	act	on	a	whim,	unconstrained	by	rules,	 there	can	be	no	rule	of	
law.	 This	 expresses	 the	 ‘unavoidable	 paradox’	 of	 power	 being	 limited	 by	 law	 (Raz	
1979;	Krygier	2006;	Krygier	2016),	which	is	essential	to	the	very	existence	of	the	rule	
of	law.	At	some	level,	for	the	rule	of	law	to	be	present,	the	law	must	be	capable	of	
imposing	“meaningful”	restraint	on	the	state	(Peerenboom	2004:	2).	
	
In	 post-authoritarian,	 transitional	 or	 hybrid	 regimes	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 discourse	
assumes	an	even	greater	importance	(Kleinfeld-Belton	2012;	UNDP	2017).	Talk	of	the	
rule	 of	 law	 can	 be	 ‘seductive’,	 speaking	 to	 values	 and	 working	 practices	 such	 as	
‘justice,	objectivity,	certainty,	uniformity,	universality	and	rationality’	(McEvoy	2007:	
417)	 –	 ideals	 that	 are	particularly	prized	 in	places	where	 the	 rule	of	 law	has	been	
distorted	or	indeed	was	entirely	absent	in	the	previous	regime.	Inevitably,	however,	
the	discourse	can	become	 infused	with	competing	political	and	social	 claims.	Local	
activists	may	use	the	rule	of	law	as	a	rallying	cry	to	underpin	their	political	struggle	
against	 those	 in	 authority.	 International	 development	 organisations	 also	 often	
invoke	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 as	 a	 prerequisite	 to	 an	 overall	 development	 strategy	 in	 a	
similar	 fashion	to	financial	actors	seeking	to	secure	economic	stability	 in	 ‘emerging	
markets’	 by	 creating	 legal	 and	 regulatory	 predictability.	 In	 contrast,	 authoritarian	
governments	often	seek	to	 legitimise	their	actions	by	 invoking	rule	of	 law	rhetoric,	
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when	 in	 reality	 they	 are	 practising	 law	 and	 order,	 securitisation	 or	 repression.	
Rajah’s	 insightful	 study	on	how	 the	Singapore	 state	effectively	demonises	 criticism	
and	stifles	dissent	using	the	legal	system	as	an	effective	adjunct	to	state	power	while	
espousing	its	commitment	to	the	rule	of	law	(Rajah	2012:	279)	is	a	case	in	point.		
	
In	 many	 such	 contexts	 authoritarian	 legal	 power	 is	 exercised	 less	 visibly	 through	
undermining	 the	 independence	of	 the	 judiciary	and	 the	 legal	profession	 (Moustafa	
2014:	283;	Massoud	2013:	7;	Moustafa	2003:	926).	Thus	for	example,	in	post-Soviet	
Russia	 and	 modern-day	 China	 formal	 alignment	 with	 international	 standards	 to	
secure	regime	 legitimacy	and	access	to	global	markets	has	 long	been	accompanied	
by	informal	and	unseen	practices	–	such	as	exerting	indirect	control	over	judges	and	
lawyers	 through	 inducements,	 threats	 and	 practical	 restrictions	 –	 reducing	 the	
capacity	 of	 the	 legal	 apparatus	 to	 meaningfully	 challenge	 the	 power	 of	 the	 State	
(Kahn	2007;	Solomon	2010;	Tam	2012).	Such	hidden	practices	have	been	described	
as	 the	 ‘tragedy’	 of	what	passes	 for	 the	 rule	of	 law	 in	 authoritarian	 regimes	 (Engle	
Merry	2016:	467),	directly	speaking	to	the	substantive	inability	of	the	legal	system	to	
‘…bind	both	the	ruled	and	the	ruler	and	guide	behaviour’	(Raz	1979:	212-213).		
	
In	 his	 seminal	 article	 on	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law,	 Raz	 emphasises	 the	
importance	of	distinguishing	the	concept	from	what	he	describes	as	the	other	virtues	
of	 a	 legal	 system	 such	 as	 democracy,	 justice,	 equality,	 human	 rights,	 respect	 and	
dignity	 (1979:	 211).	 The	 principal	 danger	 of	 this	 conflation	 is	 that	 pursuing	 such	
other	 laudable	 aims	 through	 the	 legal	 system	may	 be	 as	 he	 puts	 it	 “disqualified”	
(1979:	 229)	 by	 certain	 formulations	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 –	 particularly	 formalist	
theories.	 It	 is	 for	this	reason	that	we	are	 interested	 in	examining	how,	 in	hybrid	or	
authoritarian	 regimes	 where	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 debate	 may	 be	 hamstrung	 by	
entrenched	 power,	 such	 other	 virtues	 can	 nevertheless	 be	 promoted	 by	 lawyers	
operating	within	the	legal	system.	In	addition,	our	aim	is	to	interrogate	how	power	
may	 be	 more	 subtly	 resisted,	 “disrupted”	 (Munger	 2017:10),	 “deflected”	 or	
“evaded”	 (Mezey	 2011:	 147)	 in	 contexts	 where,	 on	 the	 surface	 at	 least,	 there	
appears	 to	be	 little	 capacity	 to	 formally	 restrain	 arbitrary	 state	power.	As	Munger	
(2017:	 10)	 explains,	 Cheesman’s	 work	 (2015a)	 on	 the	 opposing	 definitions	 and	
usages	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 in	 Myanmar	 demonstrate	 how	 every	 political	 system	
contains	contradictory	elements	of	governance.	This	is	as	true	at	the	everyday	level	
as	it	is	at	the	national	or	global	level.	How	non-state	actors	such	as	lawyers	negotiate	
these	contradictions	–	whilst	attempting	to	uphold	other	virtues	–	is	ripe	for	analysis.		
	
Our	focus	is	on	the	specific	virtue	of	dignity,	and	the	role	that	everyday	lawyers	can	
play	in	promoting	the	dignity	of	their	 inevitably	powerless	clients	in	hybrid	regimes	
where	the	rule	of	law	is	functionally	absent.	Waldron	neatly	encapsulates	dignity	as		
“a	 sort	of	 status-concept:	 it	 has	 to	do	with	 the	 standing	 (perhaps	 the	 formal	 legal	
standing	 or	 perhaps,	more	 informally,	 the	moral	 presence)	 that	 a	 person	 has	 in	 a	
society	and	in	her	dealings	with	others”	(2012:	201).	Lawyers	have	an	obvious	role	in	
upholding	dignity,	particularly	in	protecting	formal	legal	standing.	For	Raz,	autonomy	
is	key	to	upholding	dignity.	As	such,	he	argues	that	there	can	be	no	human	dignity	
where	the	rule	of	 law	is	absent,	because	this	 is	a	fundamental	denial	of	autonomy.	
The	 absence	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 generates	 uncertainty	 in	 a	 person’s	 formal	 legal	
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standing,	frustrates	their	expectations	and	expresses	fundamental	disrespect	to	the	
individual	(Raz	1979:	221-222).		
	
Other	scholars	propose	alternative	formulations,	reflecting	Waldron’s	idea	of	dignity	
as	 not	 simply	 a	 concept	 of	 “formal	 legal	 standing”	 but	 also	 of	 “moral	 presence”	
(2012:	 201).	 Specifically	 considering	 how	 lawyers	 seek	 to	 uphold	 their	 clients’	
dignity,	which	he	defines	as	a	“property	of	relationships	between	humans	–	between	
…the	dignifier	and	the	dignified”	Luban	(2005:	817,	838)	identifies	three	components	
to	 this	 process.	 Firstly,	 he	 argues	 that	 litigants	 are	 treated	 as	 though	 they	 have	 a	
story	 to	 tell,	 and	 that	 they	 are	 heard.	 Secondly,	 that	 dignity	 is	 more	 than	 simply	
respecting	 litigants’	 autonomy,	 it	 requires	 lawyers	 to	 respect	 their	 clients’	 varied	
experiences,	 however	 humble	or	 seemingly	 insignificant	 such	 experiences	may	be.	
Thirdly,	 that	 confidentiality	 is	 respected	and	 litigants	are	not	 forced	 to	 incriminate	
themselves.	At	its	core,	Luban	contends	that	honouring	human	dignity	is	about	non-
humiliation.	 Specifically,	 a	 lawyer’s	 role	 is	 to	 protect	 her	 client	 from	 the	 twin	
humiliations	of	being	prevented	from	giving	their	own	account	and	being	forced	to	
confess	by	the	state.	Vischer	takes	a	slightly	different	approach.	Rather	than	focusing	
on	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 litigant	 and	 the	 state,	 he	 calls	 for	 lawyers	
themselves	 to	 appreciate	 the	 “multiple	 layers”	 of	 human	 dignity	 when	 examining	
how	 they	 might	 promote	 this	 virtue	 in	 the	 service	 of	 their	 clients	 (2011:	 226).	
Counseling	 against	 a	 narrow	 interpretation	 of	 dignity	 as	 the	 facilitation	 of	 client	
autonomy,	Vischer	urges	lawyers	to	recognise	their	clients’	humanity	so	that	dignity	
is	 “grounded	 in	 the	 empirical	 reality	 of	 the	 human	 experience”	 (2011:	 235).	 This	
echoes	what	Parker	 (2004),	drawing	upon	the	work	of	Gilligan	 (1982),	describes	as	
‘relational	 lawyering’,	where	 lawyers	 focus	on	a	more	holistic	appreciation	of	 their	
clients’	problems	over	and	above	the	issues	that	have	brought	them	in	contact	with	
the	justice	system.		
	
In	our	view,	Luban	and	Vischer’s	multi-layered	conceptualisation	of	dignity	is	a	very	
useful	 analytical	 tool	 to	 explore	 lawyers’	 efforts	 to	 uphold	 their	 clients’	 dignity	 in	
hybrid	 or	 authoritarian	 regimes.	 This	 is	 because	 autonomy	 in	 such	 democratically	
compromised	environments	 is	 inevitably	a	more	or	 less	 circumscribed	concept.	An	
exclusive	focus	on	autonomy	as	the	only	indicator	of	human	dignity	will	not	capture	
the	reality	of	how	lawyers	negotiate,	manoeuvre	or	even	avoid	the	legal	system	for	
their	 clients.	 In	 contrast,	 how	 lawyers	 seek	 to	 uphold	 litigants’	 dignity	 through	
‘relational	 lawyering’	 –	 by	 promoting	 recognition	 and	 thereby	 validation	 of	 their	
clients’	 unique	 and	 diverse	 experiences	 –	 can	 also,	 as	 we	 will	 discuss	 in	 the	 next	
section,	directly	constitute	acts	of	resistance	against	the	authorities.	
	
2.	Lawyers	and	the	Absence	of	the	Rule	of	Law:	Linking	Dignity	and	
Resistance		
	
There	 is	 a	 plethora	 of	 literature	 on	 the	 special	 role	 and	 responsibilities	 of	 lawyers	
with	 regard	 to	 the	 rule	 of	 law.	 Summers	 describes	 lawyers	 (together	with	 judges,	
legal	academics	and	law	students)	as	the	“special	clientele”	of	the	rule	of	 law,	who	
not	 only	 support	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 but	 also	 “institutionalize”	 its	 content	 (Summers	
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1993:	 128).	 Tamanaha	 speaks	 of	 lawyers	 as	 the	 ‘social	 carriers’	 of	 the	 law	 who,	
through	their	 ‘collective	activities’,	constitute	the	law	itself	(2007:	15).	Luban	notes	
the	 importance	 of	 lawyers	 in	mediating	 the	 relationship	 between	 citizens	 and	 the	
state,	to	the	extent	that	“The	rule	of	law	is	always	a	rule	of	lawyers.”	Without	access	
to	lawyers	to	interpret	the	law	and	to	counsel	clients,	he	argues,	the	benefits	of	the	
rule	 of	 law	 cannot	 accrue	 to	 litigants	 (Luban	 2010:	 14).	 Similarly,	 Daniels	 and	
Trebilcock	emphasise	 the	guardianship	 role	 the	 legal	profession	plays	 in	protecting	
fundamental	 rights	 from	 attack	 by	 the	 state	 (Daniels	 and	 Trebilcock	 2004:	 116).	
Others	 depict	 lawyers	 as	 ‘activists’	 with	 a	 core	 responsibility	 for	 creating	 social	
change	and	resisting	 injustice	 for	 the	good	of	society	 (Roznai	2013:	375;	Moliterno	
2009;	Budlender	1992).	
	
The	 concept	 of	 the	 lawyer	 as	 (political)	 activist	 has	 also	 found	 currency	 in	 several	
distinct	 socio-legal	 theories	 since	 the	 1960s.	 ‘Political	 lawyers’	 both	 serve	 and	 use	
the	legal	system	to	work	for	the	creation	of	political	 liberalism	(Halliday	and	Karpik	
2011;	 Karpik	 in	 Karpik,	 Halliday	 and	 Feeley	 2007).	 Classic	 examples	 include	 the	
activism	of	Pakistani	 lawyers	in	2007-2009	and	Tunisian	lawyers	in	2010-2011,	who	
protested	 en	masse	 against	 executive	 interference	 in	 their	 respective	 jurisdictions	
with	 the	 independence	 of	 the	 judiciary,	 one	 of	 the	 key	mechanisms	 of	 restraining	
arbitrary	state	power	(Berkman	2010;	Gobe	and	Salaymeh	2016).	The	scholarship	on	
‘cause	 lawyers’	 –	 lawyers	 who	 use	 their	 clients’	 cases	 to	 further	 their	 own	 wider	
political,	moral	or	other	motivations	–	is	now	well-established	(Scheingold	and	Sarat	
2004:	 3;	 Sarat	 and	 Scheingold	 2001),	 and	 has	 moved	 on	 from	 its	 early	 focus	 on	
Western	democracies	to	explore	legal	activism	in	South	America	(Meili	1998),	Africa	
(White	2001)	and	Asia	(Munger	et	al	2013;	Crouch	2011).		
	
While	 much	 of	 the	 literature	 on	 practitioner-activists	 stresses	 the	 agency	 and	
responsibility	 of	 lawyers,	 other	 scholars	 are	much	more	 circumspect.	 Gordon,	 for	
example,	 cautions	against	expecting	 too	much	 from	 lawyers	and	of	 idealising	 their	
role	as	agents	of	the	rule	of	 law	(Gordon	2010:	448).	Explicitly	 influenced	by	Abel’s	
(1988,	1989)	earlier	work	on	the	protectionist	and	elitist	instincts	of	lawyers,	Gordon	
argues	that	such	self-interest	makes	 it	 far	 from	certain	that	 lawyers	can	effectively	
build	the	rule	of	law	at	all.	Indeed,	as	Porter	(2016)	has	argued,	in	certain	contexts,	
some	lawyers	and	bar	associations	may	even	be	inclined	to	actively	sabotage	it.	
	
Taken	as	a	whole,	 the	 literature	might	give	an	 impression	 that	activist	 lawyers	are	
both	 widespread	 and	 comprise	 a	 significant	 proportion	 of	 practitioners,	 but	 the	
reality	 is	 that	 this	 is	 very	much	a	minority	practice.	The	majority	of	 lawyers	would	
probably	view	themselves	as	technicians:	their	role	is	to	apply	the	law	to	assist	their	
clients	 navigate	 the	 system,	 not	 to	 make	 a	 political	 point	 or	 to	 pursue	 a	 cause	
(McEvoy	2011).	As	Abel	puts	 it,	 “most	 lawyers	 just	want	 to	earn	a	 living	and	 leave	
politics	to	others”	(2003:	470).	Given	the	apolitical	nature	of	much	of	the	profession	
in	general,	it	cannot	be	assumed	that	lawyers	in	hybrid	or	authoritarian	regimes	will	
necessarily	and	universally	oppose	the	state	through	their	practice,	or	do	so	through	
motives	of	 social	 justice	 (Kisilowski	 2015).	On	 the	 contrary,	 Solomon	 suggests	 that	
commercial	 lawyers	 seeking	 personal	 enrichment	 make	 up	 the	 largest	 group	 of	
practitioners	in	hybrid	regimes	(2010:	360).	In	such	a	political	environment,	the	legal	
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profession	may	 have	 been	 either	 systematically	 degraded	 and	marginalised	 or	 co-
opted	 by	 the	 state,	 a	 situation	 exacerbated	 by	 a	 weak	 or	 corrupt	 legal	 system	
(Solomon	 2007).	 Lawyers	 may	 thus	 lack	 social	 legitimacy,	 making	 it	 even	 more	
difficult	 for	 those	who	 pursue	 political	 transformation.	 	 In	 addition,	 the	 agency	 of	
lawyers	may	be	shaped	by	a	range	of	variables	 including	professional	competence,	
education	 and	 training,	 organisation,	 freedom	 from	arbitrary	 sanction	or	 restraint,	
and	ability	 to	 freely	 represent	whichever	clients	 they	choose,	 the	 independence	of	
the	 judiciary	 and	 bar	 association	 and	 other	 aspects	 of	 local	 legal	 culture	 (Fu	 and	
Cullen	2008;	Givens	2013).		
	
In	countries	where	law	is	used	as	a	tool	of	social	control,	simply	being	a	lawyer	can	
be	a	political	decision.	Lawyers	may	be	seen	as	activists	and	themselves	face	arrest	
and	prosecution	for	representing	clients	who	are	considered	‘enemies	of	the	state’	
(Liu	and	Halliday	2008;	Fu	2018).	Even	‘everyday	lawyers’	working	on	ordinary	cases	
may	 find	 themselves	 in	 an	 invidious	 position	whenever	 their	 clients	 are	 victims	 of	
mistreatment:	 they	 either	 speak	 out	 against	 executive	 abuses	 and	 make	 matters	
worse	 for	 their	 client	 and	potentially	 themselves,	 or	 keep	quiet	 and	 through	 their	
silence	 legitimate	 the	 regime	 (Ellmann	 1995,	 McEvoy	 2011).	 Criminal	 defence	
lawyers	in	any	legal	system	are	the	closest	practitioners	come	to	the	state’s	coercive	
power.	 In	 an	 authoritarian	 regime	 such	 as	 China	where	direct	 and	 confrontational	
rights	 litigation	 can	 be	 a	 very	 hazardous	 pursuit,	 Liu	 and	 Halliday	 stress	 the	
importance	 of	 examining	 the	 “invisible,	 imperceptible,	 and	 uncelebrated”	 acts	
undertaken	in	everyday	lawyering,	where	lawyers	“take	mostly	manageable	risks	to	
fight	 for	 protections	 against	 arbitrary	 state	 coercion”	 (2011:	 863).	 This	
characterisation	of	everyday	lawyering	echoes	the	broader	socio-legal	scholarship	on	
‘everyday	 resistance’	 as	 originally	 conceptualised	 by	 Scott	 (1985;	 1989;	 1990).	 In	
contrast	 to	 overt,	 organised	 resistance	 of	 demonstrations	 and	 protests	 –	which	 in	
authoritarian	regimes	is	likely	to	be	met	with	repression	–	‘everyday	resistance’	can	
be	seen	as	“quiet,	dispersed,	disguised	or	seemingly	invisible”,	tactics	that	are	used	
to	“both	survive	and	undermine	repressive	domination”	(Lilja	et	al.	2017:	42).	Thus,	
Scott’s	 classical	 articulation	 of	 acts	 of	 everyday	 resistance	 (“foot	 dragging,	
dissimulation,	 desertion,	 false	 compliance,	 pilfering,	 feigned	 ignorance,	 slander,	
arson,	sabotage,	and	so	on”	(1985:	xvi))	is	a	strategy	used	by	the	powerless	to	evade	
or	deflect	arbitrary	power,	rather	than	to	confront	it	directly	(Mezey	2001:	147).		
	
The	danger	that	‘everyday	resistance’	theory	might	erroneously	elevate	ineffectual,	
insignificant	 and	 uncoordinated	 acts	 of	 individuals	 to	 a	 level	 beyond	 which	 was	
intended	by	the	powerless	have	been	clearly	identified	(Gutmann	1993;	McCann	and	
March	1996).	Scott	himself	cautioned	against	over-romanticising	what	he	described	
as	 the	 “weapons	 of	 the	 weak”,	 noting	 that	 “They	 are	 unlikely	 to	 do	 more	 than	
marginally	affect	the	various	forms	of	exploitation	that	[the	weak]	confront”	(Scott	
1985:	 29-30).	 However,	 returning	 to	 the	 case	 of	 the	 professionally	 powerless,	
‘ordinary’	 lawyers	 working	 within	 authoritarian	 regimes,	 everyday	 resistance	 as	
enacted	through	representation	of	their	criminal	clients	may	be	all	that	 is	available	
to	them.	
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The	 issue	 of	 dignity	 also	 appears	within	 the	 literature	 on	 everyday	 resistance	 and	
how	ordinary	citizens	enact	it.	Ewick	and	Silbey	(1998)	discuss	the	different	aims	of	
such	 resistance,	 citing	 the	 importance	 of	 upholding	 human	 dignity	 through	 the	
simple	act	of	citizens	being	able	to	tell	(and	re-tell)	their	own	stories.	To	Ewick	and	
Silbey,	for	example,	such	storytelling	is	a	“counter-hegemonic”	and	a	“re-enactment	
of	 resistance”,	 particularly	where	 litigants	 are	 engaging	with	 the	 law	or	with	 state	
authorities.	 Enabling	a	person	 to	 tell	 their	 story	 is,	 they	argue,	 a	way	of	 validating	
and	 making	 more	 real	 their	 life	 experience,	 thus	 enhancing	 their	 dignity	 and	
preserving	their	 individuality	(1998:	243-4).	Returning	to	the	argument	that	the	full	
extent	of	 respecting	dignity	 in	 the	 law	requires	more	 than	simply	promoting	client	
autonomy,	 Vischer	 (2011:	 237)	 cites	 1960s	 philosopher	 Gabriel	 Marcel,	 who	
explicitly	linked	dignity	to	the	fundamental	question	of	human	mortality.	For	Marcel,	
the	existential	urge	to	delay	mortality	requires	us	to	resist	death	and	anything	that	
hastens	 it,	which	would	 include	resisting	 injury,	disease	and	slavery	 (Marcel	1963).	
To	 this	we	might	 add	 anything	 that	makes	 life	 less	 tolerable,	 such	 as	 humiliation,	
disrespect	 and	 material	 or	 psychological	 deprivation.	 At	 such	 an	 existential	 level,	
dignity	can	thus	be	seen	to	be	intimately	connected	to	resistance.	
	
From	the	perspective	of	lawyers	and	other	actors	in	quasi-authoritarian	regimes,	law	
may	be	something	to	be	feared,	negotiated	or	opposed,	and	at	many	different	levels.	
Applying	 concepts	 such	 as	 “everyday	 resistance”	 to	 ordinary	 lawyers	 working	 on	
mundane	cases	seeking	to	protect	the	virtues	of	a	legal	system	other	than	the	rule	of	
law	in	situations	of	extreme	dominance	is,	as	we	shall	now	discuss,	particularly	apt	in	
the	case	of	Myanmar.	
	
3.	Rule	of	Law’s	Absence,	Resistance	and	Myanmar’s	Everyday	Lawyers		
	
In	 2010,	 after	 nearly	 fifty	 years	 as	 a	 pariah	 state	 and	 one	 of	 the	most	 repressive	
military	 dictatorships	 in	 the	 world,	 Myanmar’s	 ruling	 military	 called	 elections	 to	
ostensibly	 herald	 a	 new	 era.	 Those	 elections	 set	 in	 train	 a	 purported	 political	
transformation	 that	 further	 crystallised	 when	 Aung	 San	 Suu	 Kyi’s	 NLD	 were	
democratically	elected	to	 lead	a	civilian	government	in	November	2015	(Fink	2013;	
Kipgen	 2016;	 Simpson	 et	 al.	 2017).	 Some	 commentators	 expressed	 cautious	
optimism	that	the	country	was	finally	undergoing	the	long	anticipated,	albeit	partial,	
transition	 (Holliday	 2014;	 Dukalskis	 2015;	 Farrelly	 and	 Chit	 Win	 2016;	 Ganesan	
2017).	 However,	 events	 since	 the	 2015	 elections	 have	 confirmed	 that	 both	 the	
practice	and	culture	of	authoritarianism	persists,	which	naturally	has	a	chilling	effect	
upon	the	emergence	of	the	rule	of	law	(McCarthy	2018).	The	military	have	preserved	
and	even	enhanced	their	‘coercive	apparatus’	of	surveillance	and	monopoly	on	force	
and	 violence	 (Dean	 2017),	 confirming	 what	 scholars	 had	 earlier	 suspected	 (Jones	
2014a;	 Jones	 2014b)	 that	 this	was	not	 so	much	 a	 transition	 to	 full	 democracy	but	
rather	 to	 a	 hybrid	 regime.	 Full	 democratisation,	 if	 it	 can	 ever	 be	 achieved,	 now	
appears	a	long-distant	prospect	(Huang	2017;	Dean	2017;	Bünte	2016).		
	
The	military’s	 continuing	position	of	unassailable	 strength	 is	 reified	 in	 the	military-
drafted	 2008	 Constitution,	 creating	 what	 Article	 6d	 calls	 Myanmar’s	 “disciplined”	
  
10 
democracy	 and	 placing	 the	 military	 outside	 civilian	 control	 (Article	 20(b)).	 This	 is	
further	confirmed	by	the	way	in	which	the	law	continues	to	be	a	tool	of	oppression	
and	social	control,	feeding	a	justice	system	that	is	a	dysfunctional	mix	of	colonial-era	
legislation,	military-controlled	and	degraded	institutions	riddled	with	corruption,	and	
justice	 actors	 operating	 without	 any	 degree	 of	 professional	 competence,	
independence	 or	 integrity	 (Cheesman	 2015;	 Cheesman	 and	 Kyaw	 Min	 San	 2013;	
Crouch	 in	 Harding	 and	 Khin	 Khin	 Oo	 2017;	 Pritchard	 2016).	 Myanmar	 lacks	 the	
normative	 limitations	on	arbitrary	state	 (and	specifically	military)	power	 (McCarthy	
2018;	Myint	Zan	in	Harding	and	Khin	Khin	Oo	2017).	Without	any	genuine	separation	
of	powers,	a	state	of	what	has	been	described	as	‘procedural	authoritarianism’	exists	
within	the	Supreme	Court,	confirming	the	absence	of	judicial	independence	(Crouch	
in	Farrelly	et	al	2017).	Corruption	within	the	courts	persists	 largely	unchecked,	and	
the	poor	state	of	legal	education	has	been	a	problem	for	decades	(Myint	Zan	2008;	
Crouch	 in	 Abel	 et	 al.	 forthcoming	 2019).4	As	 for	 the	 legislature,	 both	modern	 and	
colonial-era	 laws	 are	 drafted	 and/or	 interpreted	 to	 stymie	 a	 debate	 that	 might	
otherwise	result	in	a	restraint	on	arbitrary	state	power	(Crouch	in	Harding	and	Khin	
Khin	 Oo	 2017:	 160-164;	 Dean	 2017:	 501-2;	 Slow	 2016;	 Ye	 Mon	 2016;	 ICJ	 2013;	
IBAHRI	2012;	ILAC-CEELI	2014;	Prasse-Freeman	2016).	
	
The	functioning	of	national	institutions	is	further	proof	of	the	lack	of	real	restraint	of	
arbitrary	 exercise	 of	 state	 power.	 The	 recent	 literature	 emphasises	 how	 none	
amongst	 the	 Constitutional	 Tribunal,	 the	 Anti-Corruption	 Commission	 or	 the	
Myanmar	 National	 Human	 Rights	 Commission	 are	 able	 to	 operate	 as	 a	 system	 of	
meaningful	checks	and	balances	(Renshaw	in	Harding	and	Khin	Khin	Oo	2017:	215-
234;	Nardi	in	Harding	and	Khin	Khin	Oo	2017:	173-191;	Quah	2016;	Khaing	Sape	Saw	
2015).	Widespread	impunity	reigns	at	every	level	for	crimes	committed	by	state	and	
military	officials,	whether	these	abuses	are	events	of	international	significance	(such	
as	 the	 violent	 expulsion	 of	 more	 than	 600,000	 ethnic	 Rohingya	 Muslims	 from	
Rakhine	 State	 (MacManus	 et	 al	 2015;	 Amnesty	 International	 2017;	 Human	 Rights	
Watch	2016))	or	take	place	at	a	persistent,	everyday	level	(such	as	mistreatment	or	
murder	of	journalists	and	activists:	Cheesman	et	al	2016)	In	addition	to	such	lack	of	
accountability	 for	 executive	 and	 military	 overreach,	 power	 is	 also	 exercised	 with	
insufficient	clarity	or	predictability,	through	the	erratic	and	punitive	interpretation	of	
both	modern	and	colonial-era	legislation	(Dean,	2017:	501).		
	
Such	 evidence	 comprehensively	 demonstrates	 how	 even	 the	 thinnest,	 most	
formalistic	interpretation	of	the	rule	of	law	remains	functionally	absent	in	Myanmar	
today,	 as	 it	 was	 throughout	 the	 military	 regime.	 This	 absence	 is	 a	 principal	
determinant	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 rulers	 and	 ruled	 in	 Myanmar.	 Malseed	
(2009:	 373)	 explores	 these	power	 relations	 through	an	analysis	 of	 resistance	 in	 its	
various	forms,	relying	on	Foucault’s	insistence	that	power	and	repression	can	only	be	
properly	understood	as	 a	 relational	 concept,	 starting	with	how	 subordinates	 resist	
(Foucault	1994:	329).	Resistance	in	Myanmar	is	derived	from	an	ingrained	culture	of	
dissent	that	has	existed	since	the	prior	military	regime	(Cheesman	2015:	226-7,	237;	
Thawnghmung	2011;	Malseed	2009).	The	most	visible	form	of	resistance	–	including	
the	 nationwide	 unrest	 and	 student-led	 protests	 in	 1988	 and	 the	 so-called	 ‘Saffron	
Revolution’	 of	 2007	 when	 Buddhist	 monks	 took	 to	 the	 streets	 –	 has	 been	 of	 the	
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organised,	confrontational	form	(Huang	2013).	Yet	the	response	of	the	authorities	to	
such	direct	challenges	has	always	been	swift	and	brutal	(Human	Rights	Watch	2013;	
2016).	Even	in	the	years	immediately	after	the	2015	elections,	when	civil	society	and	
the	international	community	pushed	for	a	political	re-orientation	towards	rights	and	
a	 ‘democratic’	 rule	 of	 law,	 the	 Myanmar	 establishment	 responded	 by	 more	
surveillance,	suppression	of	peaceful	protest	and	increased	prosecutions	for	criminal	
defamation	(Dean	2017;	Human	Rights	Watch	2017).	
	
In	situations	of	such	extreme	dominance	it	becomes	a	question	of	self-preservation	
for	 the	 population	 to	 find	 other	ways	 to	 deflect,	 subvert	 or	 otherwise	 escape	 the	
hold	 the	 state	 has	 over	 their	 lives.	 Writing	 before	 the	 2010	 political	 changes,	
Malseed	identified	how	at	that	time	most	forms	of	resistance	was	of	the	‘everyday’	
variety	 –	 a	 set	 of	 covert	 strategies	 ranging	 from	 tax	 evasion,	 under-reporting	 of	
resources,	 routinely	 ignoring	 military	 demands	 to	 provide	 slave	 labour	 and	 other	
forms	of	persistent	noncompliance,	feigning	illness	and	telling	jokes	about	the	junta	
(2009:	 373-376).	 The	 “tactical	 wisdom”	 of	 avoiding	 direct	 confrontation	 through	
such	methods	of	everyday	 resistance	ensures	both	 longevity	and	deniability	of	 the	
practices	 (Scott	 1989),	 or	 as	 Ewick	 and	 Silbey	 noted,	 “By	 not	 labelling	 itself,	
resistance	 is	 less	 likely	 to	 be	 avenged	by	 those	 in	 power	or	 noticed	by	 those	who	
would	study	it”	(1998:	184).	Given	the	reported	recent	 increase	 in	surveillance	and	
suppression	in	Myanmar	since	the	2015	elections,	such	indirect	forms	of	resistance	
are	 often	 the	 only	 available	 means	 of	 deflecting	 or	 evading	 the	 full	 force	 of	 the	
authorities.	
	
The	viability	of	resistance	becomes	even	more	difficult	 for	those	within	Myanmar’s	
legal	system,	especially	for	criminal	defendants	and	their	lawyers	who	are	closest	to	
the	state’s	coercive	power.	In	democracies,	lawyers	are	“carriers”	or	actors	of	ideas	
that	animate	the	meaning	of	the	rule	of	law	(Munger	2017:	8-9),	involved	as	they	are	
in	the	everyday	business	of	resolving	disputes	for	their	clients,	sometimes	 in	direct	
opposition	 to	 the	 state.	 They	 are	 also	 party	 to	 a	 system	 that	 has	 normative	
significance,	 and	 that	 is	 capable,	 nominally	 or	 formally	 at	 least,	 of	 binding	 power	
holders.	 However,	 in	 Myanmar	 the	 daily	 realities	 of	 the	 formal	 criminal	 justice	
system	 remain	 largely	 as	 they	 have	 been	 for	 decades	 (Cheesman	 et	 al	 2016).	
Because	the	rule	of	law	is	functionally	absent,	lawyers	cannot	play	the	same	role	as	
in	 democratic	 regimes.	After	General	Ne	Win’s	military	 coup	 in	 1962,	 lawyers	 and	
the	 independent	 judiciary	 were	 subordinated	 as	 in	 other	 socialist-totalitarian	
regimes.	 The	 courts	were	 co-opted	 as	 organs	 of	 State	 policy,	 although	 the	 former	
colonial	 legal	 procedures	 as	 well	 as	 much	 of	 the	 substantive	 laws	 were	 retained.	
However,	 private	 lawyering	 was	 not	 officially	 prohibited,	 and	 memories	 of	 the	
normative	force	of	the	law	were	kept	alive	even	through	the	most	repressive	years	
of	military	rule	(Cheesman	and	Kyaw	Min	San	2013:	712).		
	
The	violent	suppression	of	the	democracy	uprising	in	1988	led	to	a	re-emergent	body	
of	socially	and	politically	engaged	lawyers	who	began	to	involve	themselves	in	rights	
and	 justice	 issues	 (Cheesman	and	Kyaw	Min	San	2013:	715;	Cheesman	2015:	261),	
but	 lawyering	 in	 the	 last	 decades	 of	 military	 rule	 was	 a	 decidedly	 hazardous	
occupation.	A	widely	cited	figure	from	the	International	Bar	Association	claimed	that
  
12 
over	1,000	lawyers	had	suffered	“reprimands,	suspensions	or	disbarments”,	as	well	
as	 arrest	 and	 imprisonment,	 through	 executive	 abuse	 of	 disciplinary	 processes	
(IBAHRI	2012;	ICJ	2013).	Although	in	recent	times	the	level	of	harassment	of	lawyers	
appeared	 to	 be	 diminishing	 (but	 not	 ceasing:	 Fortify	 Rights	 2015),	 the	 murder	 of	
constitutional	 reform	 advocate	 Ko	 Ni	 suggests	 that	 lawyering	 remains	 dangerous,	
especially	on	topics	close	to	the	radix	of	military	power.	
	
Prior	 to	 the	 coup	 in	 1962,	 law	 was	 an	 elite	 profession,	 but	 it	 has	 subsequently	
become	degraded	under	military	rule.	The	formal	justice	system	operates	very	much	
as	a	marketplace,	with	bribes	and	 facilitation	payments	changing	hands	depending	
on	 the	 size	 or	 type	 of	 case	 and	 the	 particular	 action	 required	 of	 the	 judge,	
prosecutor	or	police	officer.	In	this	system	lawyers	are	portrayed	as	skilled	not	in	the	
law	but	in	the	relationships,	market	prices	and	pressure	points	necessary	to	secure	a	
favourable	outcome	for	the	client	(Cheesman	2015:	182-190;	Prasse-Freeman	2014:	
93;	Myint	Zan	2000).	Lawyers	do	not	have	a	privileged	status	 in	society,	and	 law	is	
thus	 not	 seen	 as	 prestigious	 occupation	 (Myint	 Zan	 2008;	 ILAC-CEELI	 2014:	 7).	
Myanmar	lawyers	also	remain	disadvantaged	in	education,	independence	and	access	
to	information	(Beyer	2015).	This	diminishes	their	ability	to	identify	and	respond	to	
governmental	overreach	(Crouch	in	Abel	et	al.,	forthcoming	2019).	
	
In	 recent	 years,	 numerous	 foreign	 commentators	 and	 NGOs	 have	 called	 upon	
Myanmar’s	lawyers	to	play	a	part	in	the	country’s	transition	to	democracy	and	to	be	
at	 the	 vanguard	 of	 rule	 of	 law	 reform.	 Some	 argue	 that	Myanmar	 lawyers	 have	 a	
duty	 to	 be	 rule	 of	 law	 reformers	 and	 crusaders	 for	 justice.	 These	 arguments	 are	
based	 on	 the	 fact	 that	 Myanmar	 citizens	 have	 a	 long	 history	 of	 ‘talking	 back	 to	
power’	 and	 of	 mobilising	 resistance,	 even	 in	 the	 face	 of	 the	 overwhelming	
oppression	of	the	years	of	military	dictatorship	(Saffin	and	Willis	2017;	Saffin	2012).	
Other	 commentators	 express	 the	 general	 view	 that	 developing	 the	 rule	 of	 law	
depends	 on	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 ‘supportive,	 proactive,	 skilled	 and	 creative,	 and	
responsive’	 legal	profession	 (Harding	 in	Crouch	and	Lindsey	2014:	390).	 It	has	also	
been	argued	that	lawyers	can,	and	impliedly	should,	play	a	major	role	in	building	the	
rule	of	 law	‘from	the	ground	up’,	 including	by	working	pro	bono	and	creating	 legal	
aid	networks	(Harding	in	Crouch	and	Lindsey	2014:	391-2;	ILAC-CEELI	2014).		
	
In	 contrast,	 a	 handful	 of	 studies	 discuss	 how	 individual	 activist	 or	 ‘cause’	 lawyers	
stand	up	 to	arbitrary	 (ab)use	of	 state	power,	usually	 in	 land	grabbing	cases	where	
powerful	 landowners	and	the	police	contrive	to	forcibly	remove	farmers	from	their	
fields.	Such	cause	lawyers	often	work	in	conjunction	with	the	community,	wider	civil	
society	and	the	media	to	drag	the	case	onto	a	more	public	stage,	drawing	attention	
to	 executive	 abuses,	with	 occasional	 success	 (Cheesman	 and	 Kyaw	Min	 San	 2013;	
Mark	2016).	In	addition,	there	are	sporadic	accounts	of	experienced	and	prominent	
individual	 lawyers,	 usually	 former	 political	 prisoners	 battle-hardened	 through	
previous	encounters	with	state	security	services.	Those	lawyers	publicise	their	cases	
through	the	media,	appearing	willing	to	confront	government	attacks	on	free	speech	
and	to	take	whatever	consequences	come	their	way	(Strangio	2015).	
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However,	impressive	as	their	achievements	and	celebrated	cases	may	be,	individual	
activist	 or	 political	 lawyers	 are	 not	 representative	 of	 the	 profession	 as	 a	 whole.	
Recent	NGO	 studies	have	 focused	on	 the	 rank	and	 file,	 ‘everyday’	 lawyers	 (Justice	
Base	 2017a;	 Justice	 Base	 2017b;	 Langhendries	 and	 Moriceau	 (unpub.)).	 These	
surveys	might	be	an	opportunity	to	gauge	both	the	broader	systemic	impact	and	any	
individual	 trickle-down	consequential	effect	of	 the	 tens	of	millions	of	dollars	 spent	
on	justice	sector	capacity	building.	More	interestingly,	though,	they	raise	important	
questions	 about	 how	 such	 ‘everyday’	 criminal	 defence	 lawyers	 navigate	 power	
relations,	whether	they	are	capable	of	resisting	the	state	on	behalf	of	their	clients,	
the	nature	of	this	resistance,	and	what	this	might	say	about	the	other	‘virtues’	of	a	
legal	system	in	hybrid	regimes	where	the	rule	of	law	is	absent.	Our	own	qualitative	
research	expands	upon	the	issues,	revealing	that	everyday	lawyers	are	passive	actors	
within	 the	 justice	 system,	 that	 through	 their	 representation	 they	 nevertheless	
uphold	client	dignity,	and	that	 in	so	doing	 they	are	engaging	 in	 forms	of	 ‘everyday	
resistance’	to	the	authorities.	
4.	Findings	and	discussion	
	
Given	 the	 lack	 of	 restraint	 on	 arbitrary	 state	 power	 in	Myanmar,	we	 focus	 on	 the	
extent	to	which	everyday	lawyers	have	any	influence	over	virtues	other	than	the	rule	
of	law,	in	particular	the	concept	of	dignity,	as	well	as	whether	such	actors	engage	in	
resisting	a	hybrid	regime	through	their	practice.	We	interviewed	39	private	lawyers	
and	17	governmental	justice	actors,	as	detailed	below.	The	research	was	conducted	
in	November	and	December	2017	as	part	of	an	on-going	project	on	access	to	justice	
and	 legal	 aid	 for	 the	 NGO	 International	 Bridges	 to	 Justice.	 There	 are	 obvious	
additional	 considerations	 when	 conducting	 research	 in	 an	 authoritarian	 or	 hybrid	
regime	 such	 as	 Myanmar,	 with	 ensuring	 participants’	 safety	 and	 avoiding	 the	
possibility	of	other	adverse	political	and	social	consequences	paramount	(Shih	2015;	
Ford	et	al.	2009).	Consistent	with	the	Socio-Legal	Scholars’	Association	principles	of	
ethical	 research	 practice	 (SLSA	 2009),	 the	 researchers	 ensured	 participants	
understood	the	purpose	and	voluntary	nature	of	the	survey,	as	well	as	the	fact	that	
anonymity	was	guaranteed	through	the	use	of	unique	identifiers	rather	than	names	
for	each	 interview	 transcript	 and	on	 research	 instruments.	All	 data	was	password-
protected	and	retained	in	the	sole	possession	of	the	authors.	
	
Although	 none	 of	 the	 lawyers	 we	 interviewed	 could	 properly	 be	 described	 as	
activists,	 political	 lawyers	 or	 ‘cause	 lawyers’,	 a	 purposive	 sampling	 technique	 was	
employed	to	identify	legal	professionals	who	were	generally	receptive	to	ideas	of	the	
rule	 of	 law	 and	 access	 to	 justice.	 However,	 for	 us,	 the	 political	 motivations	 or	
connectedness	were	less	important	that	the	practical	ways	in	which	lawyers	sought	
to	 uphold	 their	 clients’	 dignity.	 Cognisant	 of	 the	 deficits	 in	 transparency	 and	
sampling	 when	 researching	 in	 authoritarian	 and	 other	 challenging	 environments	
(Wood	 2006;	 Cohen	 and	 Arieli	 2011),	 attempts	 were	 made	 where	 possible	 to	
triangulate	 the	 data	 with	 open	 source	 materials	 and	 other	 literature.	 Research	
participants	 comprised	 of	 domestic	 legal	 practitioners,	 primarily	 criminal	 defence	
lawyers	 but	 also	 government	 justice	 actors,	 specifically	 law	 officers	 (prosecutors),	
judges,	 police	 and	 prison	 officials.	 Whilst	 the	 majority	 of	 lawyers	 interviewed	
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received	 their	 law	degrees	 in	 the	 last	 15	 years,	 two	had	been	practising	 since	 the	
1960s	 and	 four	 since	 the	 1970s.	 The	 research	 was	 conducted	 in	 four	 provincial	
locations	across	Myanmar.	There	were	two	principal	research	methods.	The	majority	
of	the	data	was	collected	through	Focus	Group	Discussions	(FGD)	with	approximately	
10	practising	lawyers	in	each	location.	Additionally,	‘key	participant’	interviews	were	
held	with	17	governmental	justice	actors.		These	semi-structured	interviews	typically	
lasted	up	 to	 an	 hour.	 All	 interviews	 and	 FGDs	were	 conducted	 in	 English	with	 the	
assistance	of	Myanmar	interpreters,	and	transcribed	as	the	sessions	progressed.	As	
in	most	 research	projects	with	 such	a	 small	 sample	 size,	 it	 is	not	possible	 to	make	
any	generalised	findings	relating	to	the	 legal	 landscape	as	a	whole.	However,	at	an	
individualised	 level	 three	 main	 themes	 emerged	 that	 are	 relevant	 to	 lawyers’	
practice	 in	hybrid	 regimes	where	 the	 rule	of	 law	 is	 absent,	 their	 role	 in	 advancing	
dignity	and	the	extent	to	which	they	engage	in	resistance.		
	
Myanmar’s	‘everyday’	lawyers	are	passive	actors	
	
As	 we	 have	 discussed,	 other	 scholars	 exploring	 the	 nature	 of	 political	 power	 in	
Myanmar	have	followed	the	Foucauldian	approach	of	examining	how	that	power	is	
resisted	 (Thawnghmung	 2011;	 Malseed	 2009).	 In	 the	 specific	 context	 of	 the	
authoritarian	 justice	 system,	 it	 is	unsurprising	 then	 that	 the	 first	 theme	 to	emerge	
from	 our	 interviews	 was	 that	 everyday	 lawyers	 remain	 overwhelmingly	 passive	
actors	within	this	system.		
	
Most	lawyers	we	spoke	to	did	not	believe	that	their	work	was	an	effective	bulwark	
against	authority.	In	the	absence	of	a	justice	system	that	functions	according	to	even	
the	thinnest	version	of	the	rule	of	law,	everyday	Myanmar	lawyers	do	not	consider	
themselves	as	agents	of	 the	rule	of	 law.	One	 lawyer	summed	this	up	by	saying,	“If	
taking	 actions	 in	 court	 worked,	 people	 would	 not	 be	 protesting	 [in	 the	 streets]”	
(L41).	Another	relatively	new	lawyer	told	us,	“Once	the	case	is	filed	it	is	very	hard	to	
defend	 a	 client.	 [Our	 work]	 doesn’t	 make	 a	 difference”	 (L30).	 This	 contrasts	 with	
Cheesman’s	research	on	activist	lawyers,	for	whom	the	rule	of	law	is	an	ideal	around	
which	such	practitioners	mobilise	(Cheesman	2015a:	261;	Cheesman	and	Kyaw	Min	
San	2013).	The	everyday	 lawyers	 to	whom	we	spoke	 lack	confidence	 in	 the	 formal	
mechanisms	 of	 justice,	 specifically	 in	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 courts	 to	 provide	 legal	
remedies	and	the	police	to	treat	clients	fairly,	mirroring	findings	from	other	sources	
(IDLO	2017;	Coe	2016).	Significantly,	numerous	lawyers	(L1,	L6,	L29,	L35)	related	that	
there	 have	 been	 no	 real	 changes	 to	 in-court	 procedures	 and	 practices	 since	 the	
country	 began	 opening	 up	 after	 2011.	 Lawyers,	 law	 officers,	 and	 even	 prison	
wardens	 see	 the	 police	 as	 the	 primary	 source	 of	 injustice	 or	 incompetence	 in	 the	
criminal	 justice	 system.5	L29	 and	 L30	 recounted	 how	 the	 police	 seldom	 follow	 the	
law	when	conducting	search	and	seizures,	fabricate	information	on	search	forms	and	
routinely	 make	 arrests	 without	 probable	 cause.	 	 L1	 and	 L2	 detailed	 other	 police	
abuses	 of	 power,	 ranging	 from	 petty	 corruption	 and	 systemic	 bribery	 to	 sexual	
relations	with	witnesses	or	with	the	accused.	L38	reported	how	torture	and	forced	
confessions	 are	 routine.	 Limited	public	 access	 to	 courtrooms,	 and	no	official	 court	
monitoring,	 further	 undercuts	 professional	 and	 public	 confidence	 in	 the	 justice	
system,	an	issue	that	other	recent	reports	have	raised	(Justice	Base	2017a).		
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In	 contrast	 to	 their	 activist	 colleagues	 or	 those	 handful	 of	 high-profile	 defence	
lawyers	 whose	 notorious	 cases	 are	 described	 in	 the	media,	 everyday	 lawyers	 are	
oriented	as	wholly	subservient	to	law	and	its	institutions.	This	passivity,	and	sense	of	
resigned	 acceptance	 that	 neither	 procedural	 justice	 nor	 substantive	 equality	 is	
currently	possible	in	Myanmar,	nevertheless	remains	a	useful	analytical	perspective.		
	
However,	 rather	than	the	 ‘networks’	of	 resistance	that	Malseed	 identifies	amongst	
peasant	 farmers	 in	Myanmar	during	 the	pre-2011	 junta	 era,	where	 concerted	 and	
persistent	 acts	 of	 noncompliance	 amount	 to	 effective	 and	 coordinated	 forms	 of	
everyday	 resistance	 (Malseed	 2009),	 our	 respondents	 presented	 as	 a	 significantly	
more	 fractured,	 less	 organised	 cohort.	 Distant	 from	 national	 or	 even	 local	 bar	
associations,	many	 of	 the	 individual	 everyday	 lawyers	 to	whom	we	 spoke	 rely	 on	
their	own	personal	strategies	 to	negotiate	the	 justice	system.	Munger	has	recently	
written	 of	 the	 importance	 of	 exploring	 such	 “alternative	 perspectives	 on	 law	 and	
authority”	(2017:	8),	and	we	repeat	our	insistence	that	the	rule	of	law,	authority	and	
power	should	be	examined	not	simply	by	considering	the	experiences	of	the	handful	
of	celebrated	lawyers	and	activists	who	use	the	rule	of	law	as	a	rallying	call,	but	also	
the	vast	swathes	of	ordinary	lawyers	who	may	not.	
	
Myanmar’s	‘everyday’	lawyers	nevertheless	uphold	client	dignity	
	
Although	the	everyday	lawyers	we	spoke	to	were	not	able	to	meaningfully	advance	
the	rule	of	law	because	of	the	strictures	of	the	authoritarian	legal	system	described	
above,	 they	nevertheless	 persisted	 in	 their	work,	 driven	by	what	we	 identify	 is	 an	
obligation	to	uphold	various	aspects	of	their	clients’	dignity.	Our	respondents	did	not	
simply	consider	this	from	the	perspective	of	safeguarding	their	clients’	legal	standing	
but	 also	 to	 enhance	what	Waldron	 referred	 to	 as	 “moral	 presence”,	 a	 concept	 he	
further	defined	as	“the	wherewithal	to	demand	that	[one’s]	agency	and	…	presence	
among	us	as	a	human	being	be	taken	seriously	and	accommodated”	(2012:	201-2).	
What	amounts	in	practice	to	client	dignity	where	the	rule	of	law	is	absent,	and	how	
lawyers	can	seek	to	advance	it	in	reality,	was	the	second	theme	to	emerge	from	our	
interviews.		
	
As	 we	 have	 previously	 discussed,	multi-layered	 definitions	 of	 dignity	 proposed	 by	
Luban	(2005)	and	Vischer	(2011)	have	greater	utility	in	authoritarian	regimes	where	
individual	autonomy	–	and	the	rule	of	law	–	is	likely	to	be	substantially	restricted,	if	
not	absent	altogether.	Thus,	the	everyday	lawyers	we	spoke	to	in	Myanmar	variously	
characterised	 their	 role	 in	 terms	 of	 providing	 practical	 and	material	 assistance	 to	
their	client,	enabling	their	client	to	give	their	testimony	in	court,	and	protecting	their	
clients	from	self-incrimination.	From	their	answers,	it	would	appear	that	many	of	our	
respondents	 were	 in	 fact	 practising	 a	 form	 of	 ‘relational’	 lawyering	 (Parker	 2004;	
Gilligan	1982)	where	they	addressed	more	than	simply	their	clients’	 legal	concerns.	
Several	 lawyers,	 for	 instance,	 reported	 providing	 lunchboxes	 to	 those	 clients	 who	
were	 not	 receiving	 sufficient	 food	 (L2,	 L11).	 L1	 noted,	 “Because	 the	 police	 do	 not	
provide	 food	 for	 the	 accused,	 we	 do	 so	 as	 part	 of	 our	 responsibilities.	 Our	 most	
vulnerable	clients	are	from	distant	villages.	They	don’t	have	families	to	protect	them,	
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so	 we	must.”	 The	 same	 lawyer	 explained	 how	 the	 responsibilities	 of	 an	 everyday	
lawyer	included	ensuring	their	clients’	healthcare	needs	were	met.	As	she	explained,	
“We	need	to	think	about	the	whole	client	and	her	needs.	This	can	mean	connecting	
client	 to	 family	or	 sometimes	paying	 for	medications	out	of	our	pockets”	–	a	clear	
example	of	what	Vischer	describes	as	lawyers’	understanding	of	“human	nature	and	
the	relational	needs	that	spring	from	that	nature”	(2011:	249).	Other	lawyers	(L2,	L8)	
were	 also	 able	 to	 explain	 how	 they	 had	 prevented	 their	 young	 clients	 from	being	
treated	 in	 a	 degrading	manner	 by	 the	 police:	 “We	 have	 had	 greatest	 success	 [in]	
protecting	juvenile	clients.	This	includes	protesting	about	them	being	shackled,	and	
in	 organising	 to	 fund	 separate	 holding	 cells	 for	 them.	 This	 lead	 to	 judges	 seeking	
governmental	funding.”	
	
Luban’s	 core	 element	 of	 dignity	 as	 ‘non-humiliation’,	 grounded	 principally	 in	
ensuring	litigants	are	treated	as	though	they	have	a	“point	of	view	worth	hearing	or	
expressing”	 (2005:	 822),	 came	 across	 frequently	 with	 our	 respondents.	 As	 L40	
stated,	“There	cannot	be	justice	if	one	side	is	unrepresented”.	L27	said,	“The	system	
is	 still	 flawed.	 Lawyers	must	act	 to	defend	against	 injustice,	 including	 the	 lack	of	a	
public	 hearing.	Without	 a	 public	 hearing	 the	 accused	 cannot	 be	 heard”.	 Similarly,	
another	 lawyer	 explained	 the	 necessity	 of	 representation	 in	 order	 to	 highlight	
loopholes	in	the	prosecution	case:	“We	can	be	successful	when	the	defence	is	one	of	
being	merely	present	while	others	are	guilty.	We	help	 the	 judges	see	our	client	as	
being	 an	 individual”	 (L32).	 This	 last	 comment	 speaks	 to	both	 the	 legal	 importance	
and	the	inherent	dignity	in	a	litigant	being	considered	as	a	separate	entity,	in	having	
their	unique	humanity	acknowledged,	and	in	not	being	automatically	associated	with	
others	charged	with	a	crime.		
	
The	 role	of	 a	 lawyer	 in	ensuring	 their	 client’s	 account	 is	 recorded,	 rather	 than	 the	
court	only	 receiving	 the	police’s	 version	of	 events,	was	 recognised	 throughout	 the	
legal	process.	Even	at	the	pre-trial	stage,	lawyers	can	help	their	clients	have	a	voice.	
As	 L6	 explained,	 “We	 aren’t	 allowed	 to	 appear	 for	 clients	 before	 the	 case	 is	
submitted	to	court	by	the	police.	But	we	can	aid	the	accused	by	writing	down	what	
their	goals	are	and	what	 they	want	 from	a	case.”	Some	of	 the	everyday	Myanmar	
lawyers	 we	 spoke	 to	 also	 sought	 to	 prevent	 their	 clients	 from	 incriminating	
themselves,	another	way	in	which	Luban	argues	clients	can	otherwise	be	humiliated	
and	thus	be	stripped	of	their	dignity	(2005:	834).	As	L29	remarked,	“Lay	people	don’t	
understand	how	confessions	can	be	used	against	 them.	Police	 trick	people.	 Judges	
know	this	 is	going	on.	Lawyers	need	 to	 fight	against	 this.”	Some	 lawyers	 lamented	
that	 the	 police	 block	 access	 to	 their	 clients	 (L5),	 but	 others	 noted	 how	 they	were	
able	to	dissuade	clients	from	incriminating	themselves	early	in	the	court	procedure,	
even	when	the	lawyers	were	not	able	to	be	present	(Taungoo	Lawyer	3).		
	
These	examples	demonstrate	how	lawyers	are	providing	basic	material,	physical	or	
legal	 support	 to	 their	 clients	 and	 are	 preventing	 them	 from	 levels	 of	 humiliation,	
mistreatment	 and	 lack	 of	 respect	 (hunger,	 illness,	 shame,	 forced	 confession)	 that	
they	 would	 otherwise	 be	 unable	 to	 resist.	 Such	 resistance,	 as	 Vischer	 (2011)	 and	
Marcel	(1962)	explain,	is	fundamental	to	upholding	litigant	dignity	at	an	experiential	
level.	 Even	 where	 the	 benefits	 of	 legal	 representation	 accruing	 to	 those	 in	 more	
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democratic	societies	are	absent,	this	represents	a	tangible,	if	minimal,	improvement	
to	clients’	material	condition.	
	
Myanmar’s	everyday	lawyers	are	engaging	in	indirect	resistance	
The	 everyday	 lawyers	 we	 spoke	 to	 in	 Myanmar	 seldom	 directly	 challenge	 the	
arbitrary	 or	 illegal	 use	 of	 power	 by	 state	 agents.	 As	 we	 explored	 earlier,	 the	
scholarship	 discusses	 how	 the	 nature	 of	 resistance	 is	 often	 determined	 by	 the	
expected	 likelihood	 and	 ferocity	 of	 the	 state’s	 response	 to	 it.	 The	more	 open	 and	
directly	 confrontational	 the	 resistance	 is	 to	 a	 hybrid	 regime,	 the	 greater	 the	
probability	 of	 heavy-handed	 reprisals	 from	 the	 authorities	 (Scott	 1985:	 33-34).	
Within	the	context	of	everyday	lawyering,	our	interviews	revealed	that	lawyers	still	
fear	 prosecution	 or	 government-dominated	 Bar	 Association	 sanctions	 for	 over-
zealously	pursuing	 their	 clients’	 interests,	 such	as	 filing	 ‘too	many’	 complaints.	 L40	
commented	 that	 lawyers	 feel	vulnerable	 to	attacks	on	 them	due	 to	alleged	ethical	
breaches,	 in	 contrast	 to	 law	 officers	 (public	 prosecutors)	 who	 are	 rarely	 if	 ever	
punished	in	similar	situations.	L15	explained	how	lawyers	will	draft	clients’	letters	of	
complaint	 to	police	supervisors,	but	are	 reluctant	 to	sign	 them	because	“[the	 legal	
wrong]	 did	 not	 happen	 to	 us.”	 L14	 expressed	 a	 specific	 worry	 about	 being	 the	
subject	 of	 criminal	 defamation	 suits	 from	 the	 police,	 as	 well	 as	 more	 generally	
damaging	 their	 professional	 reputation	 or	 their	 future	 relationship	with	 particular	
judges	 if	 they	are	seen	to	 ‘complain’	excessively,	an	 issue	also	seen	 in	 recent	NGO	
reports	(Justice	Base	2017b:	9,	25)	as	well	as	in	the	early	post-reform	years	(IBJ	2012;	
ICJ	2013).		
Although	legal	provisions	exist	to	challenge	executive	abuse	and	overreach,	such	as	
the	 constitutional	 writ	 procedure	 (Crouch	 2014:	 141-157)	 or	 seeking	 satisfaction	
through	 local	 administrative	 officers,	 everyday	 lawyers	 tend	 not	 use	 them.	 L3	
reported	 advising	 clients	 that	 they	 could	 sue	 the	police	 for	 physical	 abuse,	 but	 no	
lawyer	 described	 following	 through	 on	 this	 advice.	 	While	 L10	 suggested	 that	 this	
might	be	pursued	“somewhere	in	Myanmar,”	she	had	never	filed	such	a	suit	 in	her	
own	 jurisdiction,	 with	 L11	 believing	 that	 in	 any	 event	 such	 actions	 were	 “never	
successful.”	L39	also	suggested	that	referring	the	court	to	international	human	rights	
law	 or	 even	 protections	 guaranteed	 by	 the	 Myanmar	 Constitution	 were	
counterproductive	 to	 the	 overall	 outcome	 of	 the	 case.	 Similarly,	 where	 there	 is	 a	
dispute	as	to	the	facts	between	the	police	and	the	defendant,	the	lawyers	we	spoke	
to	were	 reluctant	 to	directly	 challenge	police	evidence	at	 first	 instance.	 “We	don’t	
want	 to	 ask	 judges	 to	 call	 police	who	 testify	 in	 court	 every	 day	 liars”,	 said	 L32.	 It	
seems	that	it	is	easier	to	question	the	authorities	one	step	removed	in	the	appellate	
courts,	 or	 to	 raise	 “small	 inconsistencies”	 in	police	evidence	 rather	 than	 launching	
frontal	attacks	(L35),	both	strategies	everyday	lawyers	adopt	to	deal	with	the	over-
personalisation	 of	 justice	 making	 in	 Myanmar.	 Most	 lawyers	 eschew	 direct	 legal	
challenges	at	the	trial	stage	in	favour	of	raising	the	issue	at	the	appellate	court.	As	L5	
said,	“Lawyers	are	afraid	 to	make	bold	arguments	 in	court.	That	 is	why	we	rely	on	
written	 arguments	 and	 appeals.”	 Trial	 judges’	 conviction	 bias	was	 also	 a	 common	
theme,	and	as	one	lawyer	explained,	“Due	to	the	culture	of	corruption	in	the	courts	
our	 poor	 clients	 are	 always	 found	 guilty.	 However	 our	 legal	 arguments	 are	 more	
successful	in	the	appellate	courts.”	(L1)		
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Everyday	lawyers	are	therefore	approaching	their	work	in	a	highly	strategic	manner:	
they	 have	 learned	 that	 it	 is	more	 advantageous	 for	 their	 clients	 to	 avoid	 a	 direct	
confrontation	 with	 the	 police	 or	 even	 with	 first-instance	 judges.	 Rather	 than	
squarely	 ‘resisting’	 the	 evidence	 at	 trial,	 lawyers	 can	 indirectly	 resist	 it	 on	 appeal,	
advocating	 within	 the	 lines	 of	 authority,	 thereby	 also	 prolonging	 their	 own	
professional	survival	 that	might	otherwise	be	compromised	were	they	to	acquire	a	
reputation	 of	 being	 overly-demanding	 or	 contrary.	 This	 not	 only	 reflects	 Scott’s	
discussion	of	the	pragmatism	as	well	as	tactical	wisdom	of	resistance	in	situations	of	
dominance	 (1989),	 it	 is	 an	 example	 of	 how	 relatively	 powerless	 lawyers	 are	
nevertheless	 still	 able	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 understanding	 of	 the	 law	 itself	 (Mezey	
2001:	156;	Ewick	and	Silbey	1998).		
	
By	 enabling	 or	 supporting	 clients	 to	 tell	 their	 stories	 within	 the	 criminal	 justice	
process,	everyday	 lawyers	are	“sparing	 the	client	 the	humiliation	of	being	 silenced	
and	 ignored”	 (Luban	 2005:	 822).	 Following	 Ewick	 and	 Silbey	 (1998),	 we	 can	 go	
further,	however,	and	link	the	promotion	of	dignity	to	the	enactment	of	resistance.	
In	 a	 legal	 system	 where	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 is	 absent,	 where	 autonomy	 is	 routinely	
denied	 to	 litigants,	 simply	 being	 able	 to	 tell	 one’s	 story	 before	 the	 police	 and	 the	
court	–	even	if	ultimately	disbelieved	–	fundamentally	enhances	dignity,	as	it	enables	
lived	 experiences	 to	 be	 shared.	Whilst	 it	 does	 not	 directly	 confront	 power,	 in	 an	
authoritarian	 regime,	 giving	 public	 testimony	 in	 one’s	 own	 defence	 is	 an	 act	 of	
‘everyday’	resistance.	It	says,	“I	will	not	be	silenced”	and	“this	is	my	experience”,	not	
simply	so	that	the	authorities	will	hear,	but	also	for	the	benefit	of	others	who	may	
later	 repeat	 the	 story	 or	 the	 act	 itself.	 As	 an	 example,	 one	 of	 our	 respondents	
expressed	a	view	of	the	incremental	nature	of	change	through	practice,	“Not	every	
case	will	be	successful.	Lots	of	cases	will	fail.	An	example	is	a	land	case	I	have	worked	
on,	where	many	of	my	clients	have	been	sentenced	to	jail.	But	we	use	that	to	spread	
information	 throughout	 the	 media”	 (L41).	 Such	 public	 ‘storytelling’,	 as	 Ewick	 and	
Silbey	 argue,	 amplifies	 and	 continues	 the	 resistance,	 even	 if	 it	 is	 of	 an	 ‘everyday’	
rather	than	an	‘organised’	nature	(Ewick	and	Silbey	1998;	Lilja	et	al.	2017).	
	
Conclusions		
		 	 	
“I	 try	 to	 be	 optimistic,	 but	 I	 often	 end	 up	 being	 disappointed	 by	 outcomes.	
Nonetheless	I	think	the	struggle	itself	is	important”	(L6).	
Few	 lawyers	we	 spoke	 to	 characterised	 their	 everyday	practice	 in	 terms	of	 such	 a	
struggle.	 The	 vast	 majority	 appeared	 to	 be	 relatively	 passive	 actors,	 engaging	 in	
conduct	 that	 stops	 short	 of	 blunt	 challenge	 to	 state	 authorities,	 but	 that	
nevertheless	more	subtly	and	at	an	individual,	everyday	level	constitutes	both	a	form	
of	 resistance	and	 an	 insistence	 on	 dignity	 for	 their	 clients.	 As	 L21	 put	 it,	 “we	 can	
push,	 but	 we	 can’t	 push-push”	 –	 a	 sentiment	 shared	 by	 several	 lawyers	 when	
explaining	 the	 curtailment	 of	 due	 process	 rights.	 In	 our	 discussions	 with	 lawyers	
more	 broadly,	 this	 sense	 of	 the	 unspoken	 boundaries	 of	 legal	 challenge	 was	
apparent,	articulating	at	once	recognition	of	the	limitations	as	well	as	the	possibility	
of	resistance	in	everyday	practice.		
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Domestic	 criminal	 lawyers	 are	 awkwardly	 positioned	 in	 hybrid	 regimes,	 given	 that	
their	 arena	 is	 the	 very	 place	 that	 is	 so	 constrained	 by	 authoritarianism.	 The	
limitations	 imposed	on	 the	 law,	 the	 courts	 and	 the	 legal	 system	by	power	holders	
usually	mean	that	 they	have	 less	room	to	manoeuvre	than	most	other	civil	 society	
actors.	Lawyers	are	also	closest	to	the	norms	and	institutions	that	might	otherwise	
check	 arbitrary	 state	 power,	 and	 so	 are	 almost	 inevitably	 burdened	 with	
expectations	of	being	at	the	vanguard	of	rule	of	law	creation.	Although	the	Myanmar	
lawyers	we	spoke	to	had	a	clear	sense	of	their	duty	to	assist	their	clients,	there	was	a	
reluctance	 to	 directly	 confront	 the	 inequities	 of	 formal	 judicial	 and	 administrative	
bodies	(UNDP	2017;	Denney	et	al	2016).	As	noted	by	Prasse-Freeman	with	regard	to	
legal	aid	providers	in	Yangon,	lawyers	avoid	using	their	cases	to	expose	institutional	
corruption	or	to	seek	legal	changes	that	would	curb	abuses	of	power.	In	other	words,	
‘everyday’	lawyers	fit	themselves	into	the	existing	legal	culture	and	power	structures	
to	ameliorate	injustices	without	naming,	let	alone	seeking	to	overthrow,	the	system	
itself	(Prasse-Freeman	2014;	Prasse-Freeman	2015).	Where	they	can,	 lawyers	seem	
to	be	more	expert	at	helping	clients	use	the	current	order	or	slip	through	the	cracks	
rather	than	launch	a	frontal	attack	on	unfettered	state	power.			
		
Unlike	activist	lawyers	working	on	celebrated	cases	or	community-level	disputes	who	
stand	up	to	executive	misuse	of	power	–	who	should	in	reality	be	viewed	as	outliers	
in	the	system	–	most	everyday	lawyers	will	not,	and	realistically	cannot,	mobilise	the	
support	 of	 civil	 society	 or	 bring	 their	 clients’	 cases	 to	 the	 attention	 of	 the	 wider	
media.	 Although	 our	 research	 points	 to	 an	 underlying	 passivity	 as	 the	 principle	
characteristic	of	the	everyday	lawyer	in	Myanmar,	they	continue	to	do	their	job,	to	
support	 their	 clients’	 dignity	 and	 in	 so	 doing	 to	 indirectly	 resist	 institutional	 legal	
power.	 As	 advocates	 for	 their	 clients	 –	 who	 would	 otherwise	 be	 left	 to	 confront	
arbitrary	executive	authority	alone	and	would	thereby	suffer	a	range	of	humiliations	
–	 the	 ‘everyday	 lawyers’	 to	whom	we	 spoke	were	 agents	 of	 dignity,	 very	 broadly	
defined.	These	 lawyers	do	not	 simply	 seek	 to	preserve	 the	 formal	 legal	 status	and	
autonomy	of	litigants,	even	if	the	risks	they	take	are	“mostly	manageable”	to	ensure	
their	own	survival	(Liu	and	Halliday	2011:	863).	Such	everyday	 lawyers	also	seek	to	
preserve	their	clients’	“moral	presence”	(Waldron	2012:	201),	ordinary	experiences	
and	the	shared	“vulnerability”	of	being	human	(Vischer	2009:	235).	Where	the	rule	
of	law	is	absent,	such	legal	practice	can	properly	be	seen	as	everyday	resistance.		
	
In	 hybrid	 and	 authoritarian	 regimes,	 it	 is	 usually	 the	 minority	 activist,	 politically	
engaged	 or	 issue-led	 cause	 lawyers	 who	 attract	 the	 headlines.	 Before	 he	 was	
assassinated	in	January	2017,	Ko	Ni	held	a	unique	and	influential	role.	As	one	of	the	
only	senior	lawyers	close	to	the	new	NLD	government,	he	was	using	his	skills	and	this	
position	 to	 good	 effect,	 looking	 for	 creative	 ways	 to	 ‘disrupt’	 the	 power	 of	 the	
military	 in	 Myanmar,	 starting	 with	 examining	 how	 the	 flawed	 2008	 Constitution	
could	be	bypassed.	Ko	Ni	was	attempting	to	work	on	the	most	important	aspect	of	
the	 rule	 of	 law	 in	 Myanmar’s	 ‘disciplined’	 democracy	 –	 how	 to	 circumvent	 the	
military’s	power.	Although	 individual	high-profile	activist	 lawyers	continue	to	make	
the	 case	 for	 greater	 transparency	 and	 due	 process,	 engaging	 in	 acts	 of	 direct	
resistance	by	protesting	against	hegemonic	legal	power	(Aung	Kyaw	Min	2017),	it	is	
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unsurprising	that	given	the	risks	no	high	profile	lawyers	have	to	date	replaced	Ko	Ni	
in	working	on	constitutional	change	to	shift	the	balance	of	political	power.	
	
We	 have	 argued	 that	 in	 hybrid	 regimes	 it	 is	 instructive	 to	 consider	 how	 everyday	
lawyers	 are	 able	 to	promote	other	 virtues,	 rather	 than	 to	 focus	exclusively	on	 the	
rule	of	 law	and	a	 ‘stuck’	debate	on	entrenched	power.	 In	continuing	to	provide	an	
holistic	 service	 to	 their	 clients,	 lawyers	 can	 uphold	 dignity	 for	 those	 who	 would	
otherwise	 stand	 alone,	 and	 in	 so	 doing	 to	 gently	 ‘push’	 against	 the	 authorities.	
Drawing	upon	the	literature	on	everyday	resistance	–	both	broadly	and	in	relation	to	
such	 a	 tradition	 amongst	 the	 Myanmar	 population	 more	 generally	 –	 provides	 a	
different	perspective	from	which	to	analyse	the	contribution	that	even	passive	and	
relatively	etiolated	actors	such	as	ordinary	lawyers	can	have	in	disrupting,	deflecting	
or	 evading	 state	 power.	 Although	 mindful	 of	 the	 limitations	 of	 what	 everyday	
resistance	can	achieve	in	the	absence	of	a	fair	and	functioning	legal	system,	ordinary	
lawyers	have	a	role	in	upholding	their	client’s	dignity,	especially	where	it	may	be	all	
that	 is	 available	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 political	 will	 and	 any	 meaningful	 institutional	
change.	 If	 the	rule	of	 law	 is	not	to	drown	out	an	examination	of	other	virtues	that	
everyday	lawyers	can	uphold	 in	Myanmar	and	other	hybrid	regimes,	perhaps	some	
effort	 should	 also	 be	 reserved	 to	 explore	 them	 in	more	 detail,	 because	 as	 Krygier	
remarks,	“the	rule	of	law	is	never	the	only	thing	we	want”	(2016:	205).		
	
Notes		
 
1.	U	Robert	San	Aung	is	himself	a	former	political	prisoner	turned	activist	legal	practitioner	(Strangio	
2015).		
2.	The	military	regime	changed	the	country’s	name	from	Burma	to	Myanmar	in	1989.	For	simplicity,	
we	adopt	the	approach	that	all	references	pre-1989	will	be	to	‘Burma’,	and	all	references	from	1989	
will	be	‘Myanmar’.		
3.	 The	 Myanmar	 honorifics	 ‘U’	 (for	 a	 man)	 and	 ‘Daw’	 (for	 a	 woman)	 are	 omitted	 for	 subsequent	
mentions	of	a	person’s	name.	
4.	It	should	be	noted	that	recent	development	assistance	has	been	attempting	to	change	this	(see	e.g.	
Liljeblad	2016).	
5.	Community	attitudes	are	similarly	negative.	 	See	Consolidated	Summary	Report:	Access	to	Justice	
and	 Informal	 Justice	 Systems	 (UNDP	2017)	p.	 35	 (65%	of	people	 thought	police	were	not	 fair;	 61%	
reported	that	police	outcomes	were	not	fair). 
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